Napoli Inquiry report commands respect
Charles Hattersley, marine law expert and partner at the Plymouth UK office of Ashfords Solicitors, gave invaluable evidence to the inquiry into the grounding of the containership MSCNapoli off Devon in January 2007 after severe storms in the English Channel had damaged its hull. What follows is an edited version of his comments on the inquirys findings.
The comprehensive, well balanced and analytical report prepared in the wake of the ‘Napoli’ disaster produced some positive and far reaching recommendations. These recommendations total 40 in number, have been carefully thought out, and cover fundamental aspects of the wide variety of operations that arose as a result of the grounding of the Napoli off Branscombe.
The report includes hard hitting and germane comments in respect of command and control, communications, local contingency planning, finance and other matters, particularly with reference to the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”).
As a result of painstaking research and a two week inquiry, Professor Mercer has produced a report which should not gather dust on library shelves or be consigned to an infrequently accessed website folder. It condenses a number of complex issues into a very readable and digestible document which has been well illustrated by contemporaneous evidence coupled with subsequent detailed research. If acted upon this report should inure not only to the benefit of organisations and residents that carry out their business near to the UK coastline, but also to the shipping industry (and in particular the container sector) and should, if the recommendations are accepted, improve, in some areas dramatically, the fit for purpose nature of that industry.
Understandably, press reports to date have focused upon the need to streamline the command and control procedure and in particular the appointment of a land based Secretary of State’s Representative for Salvage, cleverly given the acronym SoSREPoS. This individual should be given the same powers ashore as the SoSREP has at sea
Following his extensive investigations Professor Mercer has, quite rightly, seen fit to adopt such a procedure ashore and made strong recommendations that such centralisation would not only channel the resources of other organisations such as the MCA, fire and rescue, highway authority, environment agency, National Trust, Wildlife Trust, RSPB and local authorities, but also, provide a genuine one-stop-shop in control of all shore based incidents. Indeed, the report emphasises the fact that ‘over-reaction must never be a valid criticism’. In other words, one individual with centralised powers is best suited to coordinate the optimum outcome of any such incident.
The report also assesses by way of practical and urbane analysis that whilst communication problems were at the heart of difficulties experienced during the shore based aspects of the casualty, such as the notorious looting incidents between 20 and 24 January 2007, a rationalisation and simplification of the numerous interest groups would be best served if the SoSREPoS system was implemented. In doing so the report recognises that the apex system of control, i.e. ultimate authority must vest in one individual, is the best way to control future incidents. It would be easy to diminish or sideline such a recommendation on the basis that powerful interest groups would not be properly represented. However given the success (and indeed envy from other nations) of the UK SoSREP system, then Professor Mercer’s finely worded 17 recommendations on this point should not only carry weight and gravitas at national level, but also be implemented in the earliest time frame possible.
Additionally, notwithstanding a very sophisticated and detailed network of procedures, local authority emergency plans, etc, it is clear that this provision of the NCP has not concentrated enough on non-oil related incidents. Cargo on board the Napoli was non toxic and thankfully there was remarkably little oil spill. In addition, the report encourages the creation or enforcement of legislation which avoids the perverse situation of, for example, harbour masters having to become ports of refuge for casualties (because they are ordered to do so by SoSREP), but nevertheless being liable for all the expense and risks involved in such a decision.
The expense dealing with the Napoli incident was quite extraordinarily high; not only was it the second most expensive casualty in maritime history (after the ‘Exxon Valdez), but the numerous claims arising out of the substantial amount of work necessary to deal with all aspects of the incident, in a very large number of cases remain unpaid. This is partly because of the limitation regime that governs the shipping industry, but also because no central government and/or local authority funds are available to compensate hard working organisations or individuals that make a dramatic and, at times, essential contribution to such casualty clean up operations. The report recommends that this should not be allowed to continue. Accordingly it is proposed that government should make commitment along the lines of the “Bellwin Fund” which, for example, has been deployed in recent cases of inland flooding. It is also emphasised that more close cooperation should be established with the European Union which is moving ahead with new legislation as a direct result of the sinking of the ‘Erika’ off the coast of Brittany in December 1999, and the IMO.
This report is succinct, legible, and highly digestible. Further, it is refreshingly short and well illustrated. It should be essential reading for all appropriate individuals involved in government (particularly in the transport sectors), and organisations that support the enhancement of the environment. In particular it should be read carefully by shipping industry executives because at the very least, it is a major wake up call for the container industry.
